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1 Introduction 
People like simple stories and clear narratives. In the early years of the twenty-first 
century, the narrative of ‘emerging powers’ and ‘rising powers’ seemed to provide a clear 
and powerful picture of how international relations and global politics were changing. 
Indeed, there was an upsurge of policy and academic debate about the growing importance 
of non-Western regions and their leading states—notably Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa, the so-called BRICS states or emerging powers—for international politics and 
the world economy. The story suggested that power was diffusing away from the United 
States and the West; that the emerging powers were becoming far more consequential 
actors, both globally and within ‘their’ regions; and that, to remain effective and legitimate, 
global governance institutions needed to be reformed in order to accommodate their rise. 
The main elements of this ‘rise’ narrative are by now well known. One of the most visible 
signs of change was increased diplomatic activism by large developing countries – 
coalitional politics within the World Trade Organization (WTO) following the Cancun 
Summit in 2003; the formation of the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil and South Africa) 
in June 2003; the activities of the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) countries at 
the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in 2009; and the formation, diplomatic 
consolidation and gradual institutionalization of the BRICS themselves. The emerging 
powers were seen to be pursuing a dual track strategy. If one side of diplomatic activism 
was to seek greater influence and greater voice within existing institutions (as with the 
desire of Brazil and India to secure permanent membership of the UN Security Council), the 
other concerned the creation of alternative forms of cooperation, or what can be seen as 
‘exit options’, such as the BRICS New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), or China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
On their own these events might have attracted only passing attention. To many, however, 
they reflected deeper structural changes that were taking place in the global economy. The 
BRICS were deemed important not just because of their rapid economic development but 
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because of the predicted structural changes that would fundamentally alter the balance of 
global economic power and transform the global economy (Wilson and Purushothaman 
2003). The narrative, then, was centred largely on the rise of the rest and the decline of the 
West, characterized by an irreversible shift of power from West to East (Kupchan 2012; 
Serfaty 2011; Layne 2012; Barma et al 2009; Zakaria 2012). 
Yet the story has not unfolded in the way many analysts expected. Over fifteen years since 
the BRIC label first came into being in 2001, the plotline can easily be read to suggest that 
the story had ended.1 Emerging economies have witnessed slower growth or even outright 
recession, an intensification of capital flight, and an erosion of the export-led growth on 
which their emergence was seen to depend. The economic frailties and vulnerabilities have 
become once more evident. At the same time, social tensions and political instability have 
spread, often driven by corruption and by protests at corruption. The political crises in 
Brazil and South Africa, for example, are deep, systemic and undoubtedly the most serious 
since their respective democratic transitions. Expectations that the emerging powers 
would overhaul and reform global governance institutions have now been deemed overly 
optimistic. Once heralded as the engine of global growth, many analysts now highlight the 
vacuous hype surrounding the BRICS and refer to the ‘BRICS fallacy’ (Pant 2013). Rather 
than a single collective story about the BRICS’ linear trajectory to greater growth and 
power, we have observed instead multiple narratives of more measured and uneven 
growth across the emerging world (Sharma 2012; Foroohar 2015; Nossel 2016). Optimistic 
and linear accounts of the ‘rise of the rest’ have largely fallen out of fashion. 
Right through the debate, many have argued against the myth of US decline, stressing 
instead the continuing dominance of the US (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016; Cox 2012). Neo-
realists emphasize the multi-dimensional nature of US military power. From their 
perspective, if there has been any systemic change it is a story that concerns China alone 
(Mearsheimer 2010; 2014). Liberals such as John Ikenberry and Joseph Nye have 
                                                        
1 The BRIC label was first coined by Jim O’Neill in 2001. South Africa joined in 2010, expanding the grouping 
to BRICS. 
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continued to stress the long-run strength and attractiveness of the global liberal order and 
the resources of soft power that attach uniquely to Western societies and to Western global 
modernity, although they concede that the current Trump administration is posing a 
challenge to the liberal project (Ikenberry 2017; Nye 2017). 
At the end of the day, then, the initial ‘rise’ story has been far more tempered and muted, 
with narratives about ‘the rise and fall’ of the emerging powers gaining increasing traction. 
Initial projections that the emerging powers were going to remake the world have 
regressed into ‘business as usual’. For many, the debate is over and they have concluded, 
quite simply, that it was all much ado about not very much. 
This chapter rejects such a view. We argue that by bringing power, agency and values back 
into the discussion, the emerging powers are in many ways leading us to reorient our 
thinking about how the world has been, is, and should be governed. The aim here is not to 
engage in a comprehensive assessment of the emerging powers’ impact on global order—
that would be well beyond the scope of a single paper—but rather to consciously reflect on 
current debates and to use the emerging powers as a lens to open up broader conceptual 
and theoretical questions surrounding power, constructions of the ‘global’, and what this 
means for the renegotiation of global order and the changing character of global 
governance. 
This chapter proceeds in two parts. The first section focuses on the globalization of 
international society, highlighting the need to go beyond material conceptions of power 
and to locate the emerging powers within a broader historical timeframe. This involves 
moving beyond a narrative whereby the emerging powers are depicted “as helpless actors 
who happened to stumble into an unexpected and undeserved decade of growth” (Stuenkel 
2016, 197). We thus lay out an alternative account of the diffusion in the global distribution 
of political agency, creating the potential for greater resistance and contestation over who 
defines and participates in global politics.  
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The second section examines the implications of this alternative account for contemporary 
debates about global order and global governance. It outlines how, for much of the post-
Cold War period, global order was largely understood through the Western liberal frame of 
global governance. We identify the limitations and critiques of such framing, highlighting 
instead that the position and evolving role of the emerging powers must be understood in 
light of the on-going relationship between contrasting conceptions, theories and practices 
of global order. We therefore emphasize the on-going centrality of fundamental political 
issues concerning representation, responsibility, legitimacy and authority in an evolving 
global order.  
 
2 The Globalization of International Society 
In order to understand why the simple story of emerging powers is wrong, we need to 
challenge, in quite fundamental ways, the terms of the debate. Framing it in classical IR 
terms as a question of the distribution of material power, of ‘who is up, and who is down’, 
ignores the historicity of the very different ways in which social power is constituted and in 
which systemic change occurs. Any analysis that seeks to examine the emerging powers 
within a shifting global order must thus place them within a broader historical context and 
move beyond material conceptions of power. Indeed, analyses that focus primarily on 
material power “fail to take into account the social, nonmaterial dynamics of international 
relations through which states negotiate their relative status and ascribe legitimacy to 
order” (Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2017, 281). Discussions of power and influence must 
therefore also emphasize the importance of ideational factors, introducing normative and 
social content to understandings of power, and—most fundamentally—an understanding 
that power is nested and embedded in social structures (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Bull 
1977; Hurd 1999; Wendt 1999). This also includes a reconsideration of history and viewing 
all patterns of global order as essentially historically constructed. A central part of the 
problem of global order in the 20th century, after all, was the struggle of the Third World or 
later the Global South against what was widely understood as the on-going legacy of the 
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Western-dominated international society and global order that rose to power in the 19th 
century. It is a recognition that the empowerment and social and political mobilization of 
the previously subordinate has been one of the great drivers of historic change, indeed 
perhaps the most important of all; and that, as a consequence, the global order in which we 
live is now far more strongly global. 
A different understanding of how international society has become far more strongly global 
emphasizes five elements. At its core this is a story of power diffusion. The claim is that the 
historically unprecedented Western dominance created in the 19th century has indeed been 
challenged—although not in a linear process and with many remaining elements of 
hierarchy, stratification and inequality. But the claim is also that this process is 
fundamentally about the diffusion of political agency and involves many varied forms of 
power.  
First, it begins with the notion of the globalization of international society itself. Although 
globalization is usually seen in contradistinction to the state and as a phenomenon that 
poses a fundamental challenge to the state, the most ignored—or taken for granted—
aspect of globalization has been the globalization of the nation-state. For the first time in 
human history there is a single global political system with a set of legal and political 
institutions, diplomatic practices, and accompanying ideologies that developed in Europe 
and which, in the traditional parlance, ‘expanded’ to form a global international society 
(Bull and Watson 1984).  
To be sure, a significant amount of attention has been devoted to the fate of the state in the 
developing world, to ‘failed states’ and ‘ungoverned spaces’, and to the extent to which the 
Weberian ideal-type of the ‘nation-state’ provides a very uncertain guide to the non-
Western world. Yet despite all these qualifications, it is the globalization of an international 
political society that has provided the most important framework for socio-political agency 
and for the organization of economic development, whether that development has been 
statist and developmentalist, or market-liberal. The state and state-based projects of 
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national power and national assertion continue to be central to most of what is going on 
inside many large developing states and societies. From this perspective it is simply 
erroneous to suggest that the state is not central to the IR of the Global South, as much 
critical writing suggests. Undoubtedly, we need to recognize that there are many varieties 
of state and nation-building which, even if they share an elective affinity with the European 
‘original’, are distinctive and different. Nevertheless, broadly based processes of state-
building and nation-building have taken place, which, for all the fragilities and failures, 
underpin the globality of the international political system.  
Second, if we think historically, we are quickly forced to look beyond the immediate post-
Cold War period. The focus on the post-Cold War period and on the apparent naturalness of 
a Western-dominated, self-described ‘liberal’ order has led to a bizarre foreshortening, 
indeed distortion, of history. There was never a liberal global order during the Cold War as 
the US was clearly not hegemonic globally. Geopolitically, there was a balance of power, 
albeit shifting and asymmetrical. Ideologically, the Cold War involved a clash of rival 
visions of Western modernity, particularly as it was played out across the post-colonial 
world. Equally, the US and the West were challenged both in power terms and in 
ideological terms by the Third World (Bull and Watson 1984; Westad 2005). From this 
perspective, contemporary challenges to the Western-led global order are not new but 
rather represent a continuation of an older pattern that was interrupted but not 
fundamentally dislodged by the brief and fleeting period of US unipolarity. So, far from 
being some kind of normal state, the period from 1990 to the early 2000s is the historical 
anomaly, not the norm. 
This history also helps us to understand the reasons and motivations for challenge, above 
all to claim recognition and respect. In some cases, we need to enquire into on-going 
perceptions of second-class treatment, subalterneity, marginalization, and of subordinate 
status within an unequal and exploitative global political and economic system. In other 
cases, we need to explore the culturally or civilizationally distinctive character of particular 
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emerging states and societies. Hence what mattered about the rise of Japan in the first half 
of the 20th century was not simply its military or economic power, but rather its role as the 
first Asian great power to assert the norm of racial equality and to use pan-Asianism as a 
vehicle to remove the influence of Western powers. A central theme of many contemporary 
Chinese or Indian views of a more just global order is therefore the need for civilizational 
pluralism and a greater understanding and tolerance of different cultural traditions.  
Third, the power involved in this process has seldom been about the straightforward 
possession of material resources. There have certainly been major examples of material 
shifts, such as the aforementioned rise of Japan in the first half of the 20th century. The 
agency of the non-Western world has nevertheless taken many different forms: civil 
resistance that played such an important role in many phases of the unwinding of imperial 
projects, such as the British in India; and armed resistance in which the power of the 
apparently powerless raised the costs of fighting and undermined any easy link between 
military ‘victory’ and political ‘success’—from Algeria, to Vietnam, to Iraq and Syria. Much 
of this agency has revolved around legitimacy claims that challenge the prerogatives of 
individual states and empires to have a natural right to rule (based, for example, on 
superior knowledge or civilizational status), or the claims of the jointly powerful to 
exercise a special role in the global order (as with concerts of major powers). These forms 
of agency were fundamental in many of the great normative changes of the 20th century, 
such as racial equality and self-determination, that resulted in revolution and the end of 
formal empire. 
Such agency remains central, particularly in claims for representation and the legitimacy of 
global order in the 21st century. Whatever the short-term fixes, such as revising the voting 
structure of the Bretton Woods institutions or reforming membership of the UN Security 
Council, the deeper and more fundamental issue concerns the meaning of global democracy in 
the 21st century. It has become ever harder to avoid discussion of the proper scope of 
democratic ideas beyond the state and how the values of democracy should be applied to 
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global governance and to the global social choices that will inevitably shape individuals, 
communities and states in the 21st century. This involves recognizing that there are 
different forms of power diffusion. One view is that power is shifting to major regional and 
emerging states as part of the on-going dynamic of the rise and fall of Great Powers. This is 
the whole point of stories about ‘Superpower China’, ‘India Rising’ or ‘Brazil’s Big 
Moment’—a limited number of important new actors acquiring substantial amounts of 
power (Bergsten et al 2006; Mathur et al 2005; De Onis 2008). This narrative also captures 
new institutional groups and clubs of power such as the BRICS or the G20 as evidence of 
the dramatically increased role of new players in global politics. 
An alternative view, however, is that we are witnessing a much more general diffusion of 
power, often linked to technological transformations, changes in the global economy and 
new patterns of connectivity. Parag Khanna (2009), for instance, lays primary emphasis on 
structural economic changes and the ways in which flows of people, energy, and economics 
are shifting the map of global politics. On this account the international system is 
increasingly characterized by a diffusion of power to many private actors and transnational 
groups, by a diffusion of preferences with more voices demanding to be heard both globally 
and within states, and by a diffusion of ideas and values, with a reopening of the big 
questions of social, economic and political organization that were supposedly brought to an 
end with the post-Cold War liberal ascendancy. Much of this account focuses on new forms 
of technologically enabled social and political mobilization with the power to disrupt, veto, 
and deny legitimacy to established institutions and political practices. Pressed by emerging 
powers and new social forces, the notion that the current distribution of decision-making 
power can be defended in democratic terms is therefore likely to come under increasing 
attack. Indeed, such arguments may well come to play the sort of critical role in the 21st 
century that the idea of national self-determination played in the 20th century.  
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Fourth, we need to revisit the liberal modernist accounts of why the developing and 
emerging world mattered and matters. Take the case of democracy and democratization. 
By the mid-1980s, Western thinking had moved from stressing the limits of democratic 
change in the developing world to emphasizing the breadth and depth of demands for more 
inclusive, responsive and accountable systems of government, as well as the potential for 
productive democracy promotion. As the 1990s progressed, however, democratization 
theorists had ever-greater difficulty in understanding the succession of surprises and 
disappointments in terms of actual democratic outcomes, despite a generally favourable 
external and global environment. Many democracies, old and new, have failed to meet the 
demands and expectations for more responsive political systems. Interventionist 
democracy promotion has failed from Iraq, to Libya and to Afghanistan. Non-democracies 
have in fact more confidently asserted policies of active resistance to preferred Western 
models. Whilst the social drive for accountability and responsiveness show little sign of 
abating, there appears to be neither any clear universal model nor an easily identifiable 
pathway to greater democratization, but rather a multiplicity of complex and crosscutting 
trajectories. The shared background assumptions of how modernizing change will 
underpin the socialization of the non-Western world have eroded and come under severe 
strain, as we will discuss in the next section. It is in this sense that Kissinger (2014, 364-
365) speaks not so much of a multipolarity of power “but a world of increasingly 
contradictory realities.” It is increasingly hard to ignore the intense contestation 
surrounding notions of a global liberal order, and the extent to which this contestation is 
not just about power and interests but reflects sharply contested narratives of the global—
nationalist, religious, cultural and historical. 
The fifth and final element has to do with global capitalism and domestic instabilities. 
Undeniably, the developing world is far more densely integrated than before. South-South 
trade and connectivity are very different today—regardless of whether these have been 
driven by market-capitalist dynamics, mercantilist resource-driven imperatives or by state-
directed initiatives (as with the BRI). It is also the case that the economic dominance of the 
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US and its allies continues in steady decline: the share of high-income countries will fall 
from 64% of global output in 1990 (measured at purchasing power) to 39% in 2020, and 
the US share from 22% to 15%. 
Yet it is worth noting that economic successes and failures are not straightforwardly 
related to political importance. The great 20th century conflicts were not the result of inter-
state anarchy alone, but were rather the result of the instability of Western capitalist 
modernity, in which inter-state anarchy, structural economic inequality and instability, as 
well as national and social conflict interacted in deeply dangerous ways. Although much 
attention is given (quite correctly) to the extremes of inequality, it is the particular political 
distribution of gains and losses that is most important—the losers in the developed world 
but also the winners and the misleadingly entitled new-middle class in the emerging world, 
both of whom are clearly the locus of a great deal of populist nationalism. Economic 
success, as well as failure, in the emerging world can create the basis for political 
turbulence, especially if legitimacy based on economic success is weakened by slowing 
growth, rising inequality, and vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the market. In the case of 
today’s emerging powers, then, the links between domestic economic and political 
instability and foreign policy action are complex. Political and economic crises may spell an 
end to coherent foreign policy and an inability to engage in negotiations over global order. 
They can also engender nationalist assertion, identity politics, and the use of foreign policy 
precisely as a response to domestic difficulties and threats to government or regime 
survival.  
 
3 Whither Global Order? 
If this analysis is correct, what then follows for our thinking about global order and global 
governance? Patterns of governance and questions about how the world should be ordered 
are clearly not new (Rosenau 2005; Weiss 2009; and Hurrell 2007). As we have highlighted 
earlier, however, what constitutes or counts as the ‘global’ in global governance has 
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changed fundamentally. Whilst the ‘global’ has traditionally been defined by a select few, 
shifts in the global distribution of power have meant greater diffusion and disaggregation 
through a wider set of global actors and the construction of multiple governance sites. We 
have evolved from a European international society to a global one, with non-Western 
regional and emerging powers assuming important roles in a shifting geopolitical and 
economic landscape. This has resulted in the potential for greater resistance and 
contestation over who participates as authoritative and legitimate actors to define which 
norms and values ought to matter in global governance. At the same time, there is the need 
to establish greater clarity over what exactly is being challenged, contested and 
renegotiated. Through our continued focus on power, agency and values, we examine three 
interrelated conceptual clusters that the debate on emerging powers highlight: the politics 
of socialization and responsibility in a complex global order; status quo and revisionism in 
an evolving global order; and the normative aspects of institutional redesign for the future 
of global governance. 
The Politics of Socialization and Responsibility in a Complex Global Order 
In the first place, the critique of Western liberal global governance has come into sharper 
focus. The starting point for much of mainstream IR has been an unquestioned assumption 
that globalization is the dominant global reality, with institutions needed to deal with the 
ever more complex dilemmas of collective action that emerge in a globalized world. The 
complexity of governance challenges meant that international law and international regimes 
would necessarily increase in number, scope and variety. As institutionalization deepened 
and the discourse of governance spread to countries that had previously been resistant 
(China most obviously), it became increasingly common to suggest that the global 
governance frame implied a broader and far-reaching change in the character of 
international politics: that the global governance optic was replacing anarchy as the most 
important way of thinking about the subject.  
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To that end, much of the discourse pertaining to the emerging powers revolved around 
‘socialization’ and ‘responsibility’, with ‘the West’ socializing ‘the rest’ into more 
responsible patterns of behaviour. Initially oriented towards urging a rising China to 
become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ and be more heavily invested in sustaining the system 
from which it has benefited, the language of responsibility expanded to encompass the 
other emerging powers (Zoellick 2005; Narlikar 2013; Dormandy 2007; Brimmer 2014). It 
is premised on the US strategy—what some have labelled ‘the responsibility doctrine’—
that the emerging powers should assume a greater share of responsibility and contribute to 
global governance under American-led collective action (Hachigan and Shorr 2013). 
Emerging powers should act as responsible stewards, providing global public goods and 
contributing to the maintenance of a Western-dominated international order. 
The historical preconditions for these assumptions were nevertheless largely marginalized 
or rarely investigated, driven by the apparent stability of a Western and US-dominated 
geopolitical order and the belief in long-run modernizing dynamics that would counter the 
types of ideological or cultural divergences that had all too often stood in the way of 
effective governance in the past. From this perspective, mainstream Western writing on 
governance and institutions all too easily slips into an analysis of how ‘we’ can ‘order’ and 
‘govern’ globalization in a way that preserves Western primacy and reflects ‘our’ own 
values and interests. These types of debates on global order were therefore dominated by a 
dual liberal hegemony: a historicist hegemony that too easily assumed that history is 
moving down a one-way street; and an analytical liberal hegemony that tended to work 
with a narrow notion of agency, with too little room for the historical analysis of the 
structures within which supposedly ahistorical logics of rational choice and collective 
action play out, and still less room for understanding their temporal and geographical 
rootedness.  
Over the years, however, discourses surrounding the emerging powers have made it clear 
that such Western liberal narratives represent only one part of the picture. They revealed 
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that liberal writing on global order and global governance tended to skirt far too easily over 
the problem of managing power, especially unequal power, and the difficulties of mediating 
between conflicting values. The focus on collective action problems and the provision of 
global public goods glossed over concerns with the ordering and preservation of power, as 
well as tensions between the governors and the governed, with rather little attention to the 
voices and values of the non-Western world. Indeed, from the perspective of the Global 
South, existing global governance structures institutionalize hierarchies that perpetuate 
Western hegemony and ideas (Vieira 2012, 313).  
Much of the academic analysis since then has taken the form of critique—demonstrating 
the ways in which privileging the European experience has denied the non-West of their 
own history, contesting various assumptions and linear trajectories of the ‘liberal’ order, 
and giving far greater weight to inequality, hierarchy and coercion (Barkawi and Laffey 
2006; Dunne 2010; Bukovansky 2016). Simple socialization models are deemed 
problematic because they assume a one-directional process, denying agency to the 
emerging powers, to their normative preferences, and to the evolving character of global 
order (Epstein 2012). More recent works have conceptualized socialization as a two-way 
process, where the emerging powers are shaped by, but are also shaping, existing and new 
norms (Pu 2012; Terhalle 2011; Yang 2017). This ascribes greater agency to the emerging 
powers, allowing us to examine their role in supporting, resisting and reshaping aspects of 
the global order. This in turn raises the importance of examining contested narratives of 
the global, as well as individual historical memories. It also allows us to frame the 
discussion not simply in terms of whether and how ideas matter, but whose ideas matter 
(Acharya 2014). 
A similar analytical shift may be said of the political construction of ideas about 
‘responsible behaviour’ and the discourse of ‘responsible stakeholders’. What has emerged 
out of the debate on the responsibility of emerging powers has been an increasingly critical 
awareness that ascribing responsibility is a highly political act that is embedded in the role 
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and function of power. It brings to the forefront discerning questions about which actors 
have the legitimacy and authority to assign responsibility and define the standards of what 
is appropriate. Many emerging powers are in fact increasingly disgruntled at being lectured 
accorded to Western-established criteria and themselves want to have some sense of 
ownership in global governance structures. As Wolfgang Reinicke and Thorsten Benner 
(2013, 110) elucidate, “[i]t is high time to question this narrative about the automatic, 
adaptive expansion of global governance and the Western-built global order. It is far from 
clear whether newly powerful countries such as Brazil, India and China will gladly take 
their pre-assigned seats as ‘responsible stakeholders’ in a Western-built global order.” The 
politics of responsibility thus needs to be examined in the context of a far more fluid and 
complex international society, with greater emphasis placed on the struggles and 
contestation over the location, object, nature and rationale of responsibility (Loke 2016). 
Indeed, as we shall discuss in the next section, responsible stakeholdership in an evolving 
global order, particularly under the new Trump administration, has become an increasingly 
complex issue. 
It is therefore far more accurate to recognize the complex, hybrid and contested character 
of global order—an order that faces a range of classical Westphalian challenges (especially 
with respect to geopolitics and power transitions) but one that faces these challenges in a 
context marked by strong post-Westphalian characteristics (in terms of interdependence, 
globalization and the changed character of legitimacy). In reality, there is no single liberal 
international order but rather myriad dimensions and layers of order comprising various 
rules, norms and institutions that are often in inherent tension, or contradiction, with one 
another (Fontaine and Rapp-Hooper 2016). International order, in that regard, is 
“endemically contested normative space” (Zhang 2016, 798). It is this layered, hybrid and 
contested character that is central to the way in which we might best think about the 
emerging powers and a changing global order. 
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Status Quo and Revisionism in an Evolving Global Order 
A global order characterized by contestation and complexity, in turn, compels us to 
examine the politically charged questions of status quo and revisionism in a very different 
light. Certainly, much of the debate has been oriented towards investigating whether the 
emerging powers are status quo or revisionist powers. Unlike status quo powers that are 
content with the existing ordering principles of the international system and thus seek self-
preservation of their positions in that system, revisionist states “value what they covet 
more than what they currently possess…[and] will employ military force to change the 
status quo and to extend their values” (Schweller 1994, 105). The prevailing order is 
viewed as unjust and illegitimate, and their primary revisionist goals are to destabilize the 
system and advance their prestige.  
Underlying this debate has been the common assumption that the dominant state or group 
of states are associated with the status quo, and that it is the emerging powers that seek to 
challenge the ‘basic norms of the system’ or to revise its ‘foundational principles’ (Chan 
2004). This is nevertheless an assumption that requires a degree of unpacking. The US, for 
instance, has rarely been a status quo power and, as its power has grown so too has the 
revisionist character of its foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War it has been in many 
ways a strongly revisionist power, sometimes a revolutionary power: in the 1990s in terms 
of pressing for new norms on intervention, the opening of markets and the embedding of 
particular sets of liberal values within international institutions; in the early 2000s in its 
attempt to recast norms on regime change, the use of force and the conditionality of 
sovereignty more generally; and under the current Trump administration challenging the 
core principles and values underpinning liberal democracy (Ikenberry 2017).2  
                                                        
2 This brief summary should not imply that the sources of US revisionism run as a continuous thread through 
the post-Cold War period. Whilst there are important continuities both before and after the second Bush 
administration, there are major differences. In particular, the neo-conservative self-description of themselves 
as ‘hard Wilsonians’ should not disguise the extent to which the Bush administration was, in Jean-Francois 
Drolet’s words, “ferociously predatory on liberal values” (2010, 91). 
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The emerging powers have thus not faced the US and the West within a stable, static or 
unchanging notion of a ‘Westphalian order’. Quite the contrary. Just as countries such as 
China had come to accept and to stress many of the key principles of the old pluralist 
system such as non-intervention and state sovereignty, the dominant Western states were 
insisting that many of the most important norms of the system ought to change, above all in 
ways that threatened greater interventionism and sought to mould the ways in which 
societies were to be ordered domestically. Nor is this simply a story of a traditional 
sovereignty-obsessed Global South seeking to remain in its comfort zone. In the case of 
climate change, it has been the South that has sought to protect the globalist commitments 
of the Paris Climate Agreement against the revisionism of the US (Nanda and Pande 2017). 
Most fundamentally, asking whether the emerging powers are status quo or revisionist 
powers requires unpacking what we mean by ‘status quo’ and ‘revisionism’. In many cases, 
such juxtaposition may often be too binary and it is more apt instead to understand the 
different ways in which the emerging powers—and indeed established powers—are 
supporters, challengers and shirkers in different issue areas (Schweller and Pu 2011). 
Revisionism has historically been far more frequently the result of particular sets of foreign 
policy ideas within rising states that explain why the existing status quo is unacceptable or 
even intolerable. This has often been closely associated with struggles against humiliation 
and discrimination, and a desire for equality, recognition and respect. Such status 
aspirations and a desire for recognition may lead states to cultivate a particular 
international standing and adopt various strategies to attain their goals. Such strategies 
could include mimicking existing norms to achieve in-group status, seeking to replace the 
dominant powers or the construction of a parallel order through which the emerging 
powers would be able to obtain a more favourable position—what Larson and Shevchenko 
(2010) have respectively termed social mobility, social competition and social creativity. At 
the core of these status aspirations, however, lie important points pertaining to audience 
and followership. This is fundamentally so because recognition is a communicative “inter-
subjective process through which agents are constituted as respected and esteemed 
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members of a society, in this case the society of states, and is thus a co-determinate of their 
identity” (Nel 2010, 953). Material understandings of power thus provide an insufficient 
basis for understanding the reasons for challenge and the crucial importance of status and 
recognition as key drivers of the emerging powers’ foreign policy behaviour. 
Global Governance Moving Forward: The Normative Aspects of Institutional Redesign 
If governance in international society revolves around the management of unequal power, 
the institutionalization of common interest and the mediation of differences in values 
(Hurrell 2005, 35), then what do shifts in global power mean for the institutional future of 
global governance? To be sure, many questions remain on the nature and impact of 
emerging states on global governance structures, and vice versa (Alexandroff and Cooper 
2010; Chin 2015; Gaskarth 2015); Kahler 2013; Vezirgiannidou 2013; and Krickovic 2015). 
With the establishment of these new power geometries, global governance arrangements 
are to an extent now accommodating a realignment of power to include the non-West. 
Informal institutions such as the G20, for instance, are perceived as having made a better 
effort in terms of representation and hence legitimacy, breaking down the barriers 
between the traditional ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ with key members of the Global South 
assuming full membership in the club—even as they continue to reproduce certain aspects 
of the existing order (Cooper and Pouliot 2015; Heine 2010). In addition to seeking greater 
representation in existing global governance institutions, the emerging powers have also 
created new rule-making fora to enhance their international status, elevate their 
negotiating power and advance their interests and values (Stuenkel 2014; Paradise 2016). 
Informal caucuses such as the BRICS, BRICSAM (the BRICS and Mexico) and IBSA provide 
greater regional, cultural and historical representation for a Global South seeking to 
address perceived imbalances and pursue distributive justice in the global governance 
architecture (Heine 2010; Vieira 2012). 
Debates surrounding the emerging powers thus open up questions concerning the 
composition, legitimacy and effectiveness of global governance institutions in the face of 
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rising transnational challenges and geopolitical shifts in power (Zürn and Stephen 2010). 
Many of these developments can be viewed as part of a normative project to ensure that 
global governance is not just about what ‘is’, but what ‘ought to be’ (Weiss and Wilkinson 
2014; Finnemore 2014). As Alexander Wendt informs, “institutional design creates and 
reproduces political power.” Designers of institutions make normative choices about which 
values institutions should pursue, thus empowering some actors and not others (2001, 
1035, emphasis in original). In that regard, the emerging powers undoubtedly have a 
greater capacity to reorganize global governance structures by reshaping existing 
institutions and creating new ones. They possess increasing agency to influence what 
counts as appropriate behaviour, determine which values governance arrangements 
should pursue and reconceptualize authority in international society. It is logical, then, to 
examine the emerging powers’ historically grounded values and normative commitments, 
to investigate how traditional patterns of order and governance are being reconstituted 
and explore whether we are observing a new politics of inclusion and exclusion. 
Recognizing the shifting contours of global governance nevertheless requires greater 
clarity on what exactly is being challenged. Are the emerging powers resisting a liberal 
global order, or simply one that is Western-led? Are we likely to move towards what 
Kupchan (2012) has referred to as ‘no one’s world’, characterized by multiple modernities, 
diversity and competing visions of order? To be sure, many highlight the explicit challenge 
to the existing order’s key liberal features and principles such as democratic governance 
and individual rights (Barma et al. 2009). Others highlight how the liberal order is being 
redefined, drawing attention to the different varieties of liberalism and liberal norms that 
the established and emerging powers prioritize (Kahler 2016; Stephen 2014). Yet others 
underscore the creation of a parallel order that challenges Western hegemony but not its 
existing liberal structures. From this perspective, the creation of supplementary or parallel 
institutions demonstrates a systematic realignment and reshaping of global order beyond 
American or Western claims to leadership (Stuenkel 2016; Heilmann et al. 2014). Indeed, 
as the AIIB demonstrates, the issue may have less to do with a potential challenge to the 
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‘liberal’ order—because arguably on many accounts the newly established organization 
embodies a liberal framework: working within a liberal capitalist system with a ‘flatter’ 
governance structure and greater inclusivity when compared to many other existing liberal 
institutions—and more to do with the fact that it reflects the emergence of an institutional 
order that is not ‘US-led’ (Bukovansky 2016, 94). It is these shifting contours that present 
the most interesting questions moving forward. 
At the same time, this all needs to be located within an awareness that the categories of 
‘emerging powers’ and the ‘Global South’, along with their various institutional 
manifestations (BRICS, BRICSAM and others), can be inherently problematic. Differing 
agendas on the part of the individual powers, inter-club competition and differences in 
political systems have led many to argue that until and unless member states can 
collectively develop clearer common objectives and adopt a coherent international 
strategy, any aspirational goals of the emerging powers as a coalition or community of 
collective leadership are tentative at best (Brütsch and Papa 2013; Degaut 2015). Different 
clubs of power also often advance varying normative, economic and institutional priorities. 
Such factors add to the necessary complexity when examining the emerging powers’ 
impact on the changing character of global governance. 
The bottom line is nevertheless clear: reforming global order and global governance 
involves rediscovering power and the management of power (Paris 2015). It needs to 
evolve around a renegotiated order that accommodates both the established and emerging 
powers, with both sets of powers drawing on “some common store of ideas in articulating 
status and leadership claims, and negotiating changes in the structure of authority” 
(Bukovansky 2016, 106). Most fundamentally, this will involve institutional adaptation and 
accommodation: re-arranging the seats around the table, and in some cases expanding the 
size of the table, to include those with the power and relevant interests. This will mean a 
good deal of ‘global á la cartism’, and it makes sense to think about order not in terms of 
grand architectural designs but rather in terms of a mosaic of different groupings and a 
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great deal of what Richard Haas (2010) has called ‘messy multilateralism’. A pragmatic 
reading of the future, in this regard, “will see not the renovation or construction of a 
glistening new international architecture but rather the continued spread of an 
unattractive but adaptable multilateral sprawl that delivers a partial measure of 
international cooperation through a welter of informal arrangements and piecemeal 
approaches” (Patrick 2014, 59). The key challenge will be in ensuring that such 
arrangements are complementary and cooperative, rather than inherently conflictual. On 
the one hand, collaboration amongst the major established and emerging powers would 
help to mitigate the widely-discussed dangers of power transitions and increased 
multipolarity; and on the other, such collaboration would provide a framework for the kind 
of stable understandings amongst the key powers without which more elaborate forms of 
multilateralism and global governance are unable to function. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Debates on the emerging powers have not stood still and there is no reason to expect that 
they will. However, it is not helpful to focus too narrowly or obsessively on the world of op-
ed commentary or on the feelings of a particular moment. We have suggested instead that 
there has been a long-term erosion of the Western dominance of international society. 
International society today is far more strongly global—not just in terms of economic 
globalization but in terms of the capacity of a much wider range of states and societies to 
mobilize, express their values and interests, and contest the policies of the Western-
dominated and US-led order. The most crucial dimension of the ‘global’ therefore lies in the 
increased capacity of a far wider range of states and the social forces that they reflect to 
become active subjects and agents in the politics of global ordering. This means that we 
cannot avoid investigating the historical self-understandings of a much wider and 
culturally diverse range of players as central to global governance research. Different 
conceptions of global order thus need to be unpacked and carefully analyzed. We need to 
trace the changes in the range of systemic factors and incentives that shape the interests 
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and identity of emerging powers and help explain their international behaviour. This is 
important because today’s emerging states and societies are crucial, not just because of 
what they are able to do individually, but rather because of the way in which their 
collective and cumulative choices have the potential to feed back into the balance between 
different elements of international order.  
We have also argued that we need to look well beyond a story of material power shifting in 
a world of states. Power hierarchies are not simply about material power and the ‘power’ of 
today’s rising powers is not just a matter of the power resources that they possess. It derives 
from the role that they are playing within functional institutions created to deal with ever 
more pressing sets of challenges (such as the management of the global economy, climate 
change and nuclear proliferation) and from their equally necessary role in the creation of 
legitimate institutions and representative structures of global governance. The stability of 
power transitions will therefore be crucially affected by the accommodation of rising powers 
and the re-allocation of seats around the top table of international politics (Paul 2016). 
The challenge now is how we can go about negotiating new effective arrangements 
between the emerging powers and the established powers. As we have highlighted above, 
the emerging powers have opened up important debates concerning the politics of 
representation, legitimacy and responsibility in an evolving global order. Binary depictions 
seeking to examine whether the emerging powers are status quo or revisionist powers, and 
of investigating socialization as a one-way linear process fail to capture the far more 
complex, contested and layered dimensions of an evolving global order. Moving forward, 
this means that we will need to pay greater attention to the normative drivers of global 
governance structures, both new and existing. On the whole, then, the fundamental issues 
raised by the ‘emerging powers and global order’ debate remain all too evident and 
politically and normatively vital. By bringing power, agency and values back into the 
renegotiation of order, the emerging powers have in many ways reoriented our thinking 
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about how to construct a more inclusive and pluralist International Relations that is both of 
and about the international. 
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